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Abstract: The activities of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis and his clandestine 
Black Hand organisation in Serbia have long been scrutinised in connection with 
the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 and the outbreak of the 
First World War. Regent Alexander and the Pašić government dealt severely with the 
Black Hand in the Salonica show trial in 1917 when Apis and two of his friends were 
sentenced to death, a number of officers sentenced to prison and other Black Handers 
purged from the civilian and military authorities. The rest of Black Handers, particu-
larly those more prominent, who survived the war found themselves in a position of 
pariah in the newly-founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). 
They were constantly under the watchful eye of the authorities and suspected of plot-
ting subversive activities. To be sure, the Black Handers remained in close contact 
and sought to bring about a “revision” of the Salonica trial and rehabilitate themselves 
and their dead comrades. This paper focuses on three particular Black Handers, Božin 
Simić, Radoje Janković and Mustafa Golubić – although their other friends are also 
mentioned in connection with them – who offered stiff resistance to the regime that 
had condemned them. Their cases demonstrate that some of former Apis’s associates 
in time came to terms with the authorities in order to secure peaceful existence or 
even obtain a prominent status, whereas other remained staunch opponents of King 
Alexander and their frustration took the shape of a left-wing opposition ranging from 
republicanism to outright communism. 
Keywords: Apis, Black Hand, Salonica trial, Serbia, Yugoslavia, communism, Božin 
Simić, Radoje Janković, Mustafa Golubić
The Black Hand conspiratorial organisation has become known for its role in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Austro-Hungarian Crown 
Prince, in Sarajevo in 1914 that started a diplomatic crisis between the two 
opposing blocs, Entente Powers and Central Powers, which eventually es-
calated into the First World War. Much of historiographical debate has 
centred on the relationship between the assassin Gavrilo Princip and his 
comrades from Young Bosnia and the members of the Black Hand from 
Serbia, the spiritus movens of which was Lieutenant-Colonel Dragutin T. 
Dimitrijević nicknamed Apis.1 The latter and his supporters had been an 
important factor in Serbian domestic politics long before the Sarajevo as-
* drabakic@yahoo.com
1 For the relationship between the two organisations see Dušan T. Bataković, “The 
Young Bosnia and the ‘Black Hand’,” in The Serbs and the First World War, Proceedings 
of the International Conference held at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 
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sassination. A group of officers led by Apis brutally murdered the Austro-
phile King Alexander, the last of the Obrenović dynasty, and handed the 
crown to Peter I Kara djordjević in what is known as the May Coup of 1903 
which ushered in a new era in Serbian history. The Black Hand was founded 
in 1911 – its official name was Unification or Death (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt) 
– mainly from the ranks of military officers for the purpose of fomenting 
revolution in order to liberate the Serbs still living under foreign rule, in the 
decaying Ottoman Empire and in Bosnia and Herzegovina which had been 
under practically colonial rule of Austria-Hungary since 1878. However, 
the Black Hand came into conflict with civilian authorities prior to the 
Great War: the government of Nikola Pašić’s Radicals opposed the growing 
influence of the conspiratorial officers, particularly in the newly-acquired 
territory in the south as result of the Balkan Wars of 1912–13. Even if they 
shared the same ultimate national goals, the responsible government re-
alised that Serbia was in a desperate need of a prolonged period of peace to 
digest her gains and recover her strength, whereas the Black Hand intended 
to press forward with its subversive activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Besides being a manifestation of its fervent nationalism, the complic-
ity of Black Hand in the Sarajevo assassination was also a deliberate act of 
opposition to Pašić and his moderate policy – he tried and failed to curb 
its activities. The tensions between civilian and military authorities were 
pushed into the background with the outbreak of the Great War, but they 
resurfaced again in late 1916 when the remnants of the Serbian army and 
the government found themselves on Greek soil and joined their Allies in 
fighting the enemy in Macedonia. Regent Alexander, a group of his trusted 
officers hostile to the Black Hand – and thus called the White Hand – and 
Pašić’s Radicals all combined for their own and different reasons to settle 
scores with Apis and his followers in the well-known Salonica show trial in 
1917. Apis, Major Ljubomir Vulović and Rade Malobabić were sentenced 
to death for their alleged conspiracy against the government and constitu-
tional order and an attempt on Regent Alexander’s life; a number of persons 
were sentenced to prison, and the Black Hand organisation was effectively 
destroyed. These events have been well-served by historians although the 
fate of Apis and his supporters still remains a rather controversial matter 
and continues to fan the flames of popular imagination.2 
13-15 June 2014, ed. Dragoljub T. Živojinović (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts, 2015), 139–152. 
2 This and the preceding paragraph are based on Dušan T. Bataković, “Sukob vojnih i 
civilnih vlasti u Srbiji u prolece 1914”, Istorijski časopis XXIX-XXX (1982–1983), 477–
492, and Mile Bjelajac, Vojska Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, 1918–1921 (Belgrade: 
Narodna knjiga, 1988), 39–45. For the 1903 coup see Dragiša Vasić, Devetstotreća, Ma-
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Not surprisingly, historiographical interest in the Black Hand mem-
bers focuses on the 1914–1917 period and stops with the brutal liquidation 
of that organisation. Yet, a number of its members survived the Salonica trial 
and the rest of the war; they became the subjects of the newly-created King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS and after 1929 officially named 
Yugoslavia) which was, for the most part, governed by Pašić’s Radicals with 
Regent and later King Alexander as a highly influential figure. This meant 
that the authorities frowned upon the surviving Black Hand members who 
remained suspected of surreptitious intrigue and political ambitions. The 
latter were naturally bitter on account of both their criminal prosecution 
in 1917 and the treatment they received after the war. Leaving aside the 
question of the Black Hand’s activities prior to the Salonica trial and that 
troubled judicial affair, this paper will examine the lives of a few of Apis’s 
close collaborators after the war with a view to identifying some common 
features and analysing the attitude of these ostracised national revolutionar-
ies towards the regime and its consequences. 
Apis’s downfall in Salonica had an immediate effect on four Serbian 
officers who found themselves beyond the reach of Serbian authorities. In 
1916, Lieutenant Colonels Božin Simić, Vojislav Gojković and Aleksandar 
Srb, and Major Radoje Janković were in the group of officers designated 
jski prevrat (Belgrade 1928). For more on Apis and his followers see Andrej Mitrović, 
Srbija u Prvom svetskom ratu (Belgrade: Srpska književna zadruga, 1984), 306–321; 
Vladimir Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966); David 
MacKenzie, Apis, the Congenial Conspirator: the Life of Colonel Dragutin T. Dimitrijević 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Dragoljub Živojinović, Kralj Petar 
I Kara djordjević, život i delo, 3 vols (Belgrade: BIGZ, 1990), II, 315–340, and Vasa 
Kazimirović, Crna ruka: ličnosti i dogadjaji u Srbiji od Majskog prevrata 1903. do Solun-
skog procesa 1917. godine (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2013). The troubled relations between 
civilian and military authorities are also discussed in the following articles by Dušan 
T. Bataković: “La Main Noire (1911-1917): l’armée serbe entre démocratie et autori-
tarisme”, Revue d‘histoire diplomatique 2 (1998), 95–144; “Nikola Pašić, les radicaux de 
et la ‘Main noire’: Les défis à la démocratie parlementaire serbe (1903–1917)”, Bal-
canica XXXVII (2006), 143–169; “Storm over Serbia: the Rivalry between Civilian and 
Military Authorities (1911–1914)”, Balcanica XLIV (2013), 307–356. The Salonica trial 
is covered in Borivoje Nešković, Istina o solunskom procesu (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 
1953); Milan Živanović, Pukovnik Apis: solunski proces hiljadu devetsto sedamnaeste: prilog 
za proučavanje političke istorije Srbije od 1903. do 1918. godine (Novi Sad: Prometej, 2015, 
fascimile of the 1st ed. [1955]); David MacKenzie, The “Black Hand” on Trial: Salonica, 
1917 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) and Dušan T. Bataković, “The Sa-
lonica Trial 1917. Black Hand vs. Democracy (The Serbian Army between Internal 
Strife and Military Success)”, in The Salonica Theatre of Operations and the Outcome of 
the Great War, Proceedings of the International Conference organised by the Institute 
for Balkan Studies and the National Research Foundation “Eleftherios K. Venizelos” 
(Thessaloniki 2005), 273–293.   
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to leave the island of Corfu, in which the Serbian army recuperated after 
the disasters of retreating through Albania, and go to Russia. The goal of 
their mission was to enlist as volunteers in the Serbian Volunteer Corps as 
many Yugoslavs (South Slavs) from the Habsburg Empire who had sur-
rendered en masse to the Russians.3 This would not just provide additional 
manpower for the Serbian army which was in dire need of it after the heavy 
losses suffered but also present a major political accomplishment insofar 
as such volunteers would justify the validity of the proclaimed war aim of 
Serbia: the unification of all Yugoslavs in a single state under the Serbian 
Kara djordjević dynasty. Judging the mission to Russia as very important for 
the future course of the war, the Black Hand managed to have considerable 
number of its officers sent to Russia, including the four more prominent 
ones mentioned above.4  
In December 1917, the investigation into Apis’s activities involved 
seven of his closest associates, including Simić and Gojković who were then 
in the city of Odessa – they would not be charged with any crime. The Su-
preme Command of the Serbian army demanded from the Army Minister 
to relieve Simić, Gojković and Srb from their duties in the Serbian Vol-
unteer Corps. Their belongings were also searched but nothing that could 
incriminate them was found. The four officers, however, were firm in the 
defence of their indicted friends. During their interrogation the officers de-
nied the charges made against Apis and offered information to the effect 
that the trial was the culmination of a conspiracy that had long been in the 
making.5 Major Janković even sent an open telegram to the Army Ministry 
advancing his defence against the trump-up charges, which caused great 
dissatisfaction as a breach of military discipline. Moreover, he and his fel-
low-officers in Russia embarked on an energetic campaign against the Sa-
lonica trial. They sent a dispatch to the Serbian Minister in St. Petersburg, 
Miroslav Spalajković, which they demanded to be urgently forwarded to the 
Serbian government in Corfu and Prince-Regent Alexander in Salonica. In 
this document, the officers claimed that the true “cause for this unexampled 
violence is personal hatred, spite, political short-sightedness and moral deg-
3 Ilija Jovanović, Stevan Rajković & Veljko Ribar, Jugoslovenski dobrovoljački korpus u 
Rusiji: prilog istoriji dobrovoljačkog pokreta (1914–1918) (Belgrade: Vojno delo, 1954).
4 Bogumil Hrabak, “Delatnost članova udruženja ‘Ujedinjenje ili smrt’ u Rusiji 1915–
1918. godine”, Istorija XX veka VII (1965), 191–192.  
5 Belgrade, Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [hereafter ASA-
NU], The Papers of Milan Živanović, 14434/141, Report of the Military Attaché in 
St. Petersburg, Colonel Branislav L. Lontkijević, on the interrogation of Major Ra-
doje Janković, Lieutenant-Colonel Božin Simić and Aleksandar Srb, and the report of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Vojislav Gojković, May-August 1937.
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radation in exile” and that the indictment was supported by “denouncers 
and false witnesses”. They requested that the accused Black Hand members 
be released at once and their rights restored; if the trial, however, was carried 
out to its end, they wanted a new trial to take place – and such that would 
be conducted by a British, French and Russian judge. Furthermore, the four 
officers threatened that unless they received a reply within fifteen days they 
would supply “all foreign representatives in St. Petersburg and all world 
newspapers” with their own information on the Salonica affair including 
their correspondence and other material.6 
Indeed, the officers acted upon their threats. In order to bring pres-
sure to bear on the Serbian government, they submitted a memorandum to 
Mikhail Tereshchenko, Foreign Minister of the provisional Russian govern-
ment emerging from the February Revolution. Appealing to the fledgling 
Russian democracy, the officers pleaded for Russian intervention to save the 
lives of Apis and his comrades.7 Russian assistance was particularly valuable 
since the Pašić government was considered bound to heed advice coming 
from the great Slav ally which had stood by Serbia in 1914 and much suf-
fered in consequence. The four officers also visited the French and British 
embassies in St. Petersburg and handed their memorandum. In addition, 
they found a sympathetic ear in the Russian press, favourably disposed to 
the victims of the Tzar’s close ally Pašić, and saw to it that several articles be 
published advocating the cause of Apis and his supporters.8 Tereshchenko 
did respond and appealed to Pašić to spare the lives of the alleged plotters 
against the Crown and state, but his intervention, as well as that of the 
French and British governments, was of no avail.9 The Serbian authorities 
also summoned the four officers to appear before the court in Salonica for 
their defiance and public opposition to their own government, but none of 
them did so. Finally, the government decided to retaliate and the officers 
were retired and thus stripped of any official capacity in which they could 
act in Russia. After the Salonica affair they were tried in absence on the 
same charges as their friends and received substantial sentences: Gojković 
twenty years in prison and Janković and Simić eighteen years each; Srb was 
not alive by then. 
6 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/142, “The ultimatum” of the four from St. Peters-
burg, 23 May/5 June 1917 [ Julian/Gregorian calendar – the former was in official use 
in Serbia until 1919]. 
7 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/143, Memorandum by the four officers for 
Tereshchenko. 
8 Hrabak, “Delatnost članova udruženja,” 210–213. 
9 Živanović, Pukovnik Apis, 535–545; ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/354, Gojković 
to “Dear Mister Colonel” [Pilac?], Baden, 6 February 1922.
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The retired officers were forced to fend for themselves. Simić, 
Gojković and Srb joined the Russian revolutionary army with a number 
of former volunteers – the rest of the Volunteer Corps was transported to 
Salonica and joined the Serbian army – and were promoted to the rank of 
colonel. Srb eventually found his death in the turmoil of the Russian revo-
lution; he was murdered by a group of his own soldiers.10 Gojković became 
a commander of the first Yugoslav revolutionary volunteer regiment in the 
Red Army and left Russia in 1918. He remained in emigration until 1923 
and then returned to Belgrade where he was tried again and sentenced to 
twenty years in prison of which he served three and a half in Sremska Mi-
trovica before he was pardoned and retired again.11  
The case of Božin Simić was particularly revealing with respect to the 
fierce opposition to the regime in the Kingdom in which some of the Black 
Handers would persist and the lengths to which they would go. One of the 
participants of the May Coup in 1903, he had a remarkable military career, 
especially in the Balkan Wars and the Great War when he was wounded 
three times. As has been seen, Simić was sent to Russia from Corfu in con-
nection with the formation of volunteer units and he was later supposed to 
come to Serbia, according to the plan he had made with Apis, and instigate 
a rebellion in the enemy’s rear. Simić was twice wounded on the Russian 
front in Dobruja as a battalion commander. Having healed, he went from 
Odessa to Bucharest with the intention to slip into Serbia, but this never 
occurred as he was ordered to appear before the court in Salonica. He did 
not try to eschew this unpleasant trip and made himself available to Min-
ister Spalajković in St. Petersburg to organise a transport to Salonica for 
him but German submarine warfare made that impossible. Having been 
sentenced in absence nevertheless, Simić fought in the Russian army and 
was wounded; he then went to France via Scandinavian countries with the 
intention of returning to Serbia. Having been warned that he would be 
thrown into prison rather than tried again, Simić decided against going 
back to his country. “In emigration he lived in Vienna (for a year), Moscow 
(eight months) and the rest of the time in France. During his stay in Mos-
cow he spent the whole time researching documents in ‘Red Archives’.”12 
It seems safe to assume that his academic research was focused on what 
had passed between the Russian and Serbian governments relating to the 
Salonica affair. 
10 Hrabak, “Delatnost članova udruženja,” 244–248. 
11 Srpski biografski rečnik (Novi Sad: Matica srpska, 2014), 731–732. One of his letters 
was written from Baden, Switzerland, although it is not known if he spent his whole 
time as an émigré there. See n. 9 above. 
12 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić. 
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Indeed, Simić was consumed with the struggle to unearth what he 
considered the truth about Apis and his other persecuted friends and obtain 
satisfaction for the victims in a re-trial. In the early 1920s, the Belgrade 
press, and the journal Novo vreme in particular, abounded with polemi-
cal texts which demanded a “revision” of the Salonica Trial, the authors of 
which were often the proscribed Black Handers including Simić.13 He also 
produced a large number of brochures which were published in the press 
with the twin-aims of exalting Apis’s patriotism and exceptional capabili-
ties to which the Serbian army owed so much for its tremendous successes 
in 1912–1918, on the one hand, and condemning the corrupt and wicked 
ways of Pašić and Radicals, on the other.14 In doing so, Simić kept in close 
touch and cooperated with the former Black Hand members in Belgrade 
who had been granted amnesty in 1918. Yet, they were something of pariahs 
in the new Yugoslav state and exposed to constant suspicion on the part of 
the authorities. To begin with, the Black Handers had long been purged 
from both civil service and the military on Pašić’s instructions circulated to 
all government departments and based on the decisions of the Ministerial 
Council of 24 March 1917 – the government had still been located in Corfu 
then.15 After the war, the harassment of the former conspirators carried 
on. For example, in March 1919, the retired officers were called to military 
exercise and, to make the matter more provocative, in the area under com-
mand of Božidar Terzić, formerly War Minister who had persecuted them. 
They refused unless they were given either full satisfaction for what they 
had suffered or a new and fair trial; needless to say, their conditions had no 
chance of being accepted.16
Moreover, the Black Hand members were under permanent surveil-
lance. “The Black Handers maintain the closest connections not just with 
the republicans, but also with communists. Most often Black Handers 
gather together at the apartment of Bora Prodanović, a lawyer.”17 It was 
also stated that the other place for their meeting was a cinema in the street 
across the building of the Academy of Sciences. Bora Prodanović was a 
son of Jaša Prodanović, the leader of the Yugoslav Republican Party, and 
known for his defence of communists in the court of law which in itself 
13 Živanović, Pukovnik Apis, 7–9. 
14 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/617, Draft of Simić’s article. He also condemned 
Petar Živković, the leader of the White Hand, who had risen to prominence through 
his surreptitious dealings against Apis and his supporters. See his draft article “Petar 
Živković” in 14434/620.  
15 Ibid. 14434/148, Circular by Pašić. 
16 Ibid. 14434/563, Note sent to the Cabinet, 19 March 1919. 
17 Ibid. 14434/262, Note by the General Staff department of the War Ministry, no date. 
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confirmed the accuracy of this intelligence report. Indeed, one of the most 
prominent Black Handers, Colonel Milutin Lazarević, himself pointed out 
that Jaša Prodanović was their most concrete supporter among politicians, 
along with Stojan Ribarac, formerly the leader of the Liberals. The Demo-
crats, he wrote in a succinct political analysis, promised a lot but they asked 
for patience and wanted to wait for more propitious political circumstances 
in order to obtain a revision of the Salonica trial; they were afraid of the 
Crown and at the same time needed its support to come to office.18 
Another intelligence report spoke of a trader Žika Ilić, a fervent Re-
publican, who frequently travelled to Paris where he met with Božin Simić 
and maintained contact between him and Republicans in Belgrade. Ilić was 
said to have sent 4,000 dinars to Apis’s widow, Zora Dimitrijević, “at whose 
place local Black Handers meet and where they were all gathered on the 
day of St. Vitus atentat in 1921 [a failed attempt on King Alexander’s life] 
and spent the whole night in deciding something.“19 The same report stated 
that Milan Gr. Milovanović nicknamed Pilac and other Black Handers 
were also frequent visitors to Zora’s abode from where they wrote letters to 
Simić. Those letters were then sent to Simić by one of two young students, 
both of them Pilac’s nephews; another sender was a female clerk working 
for Žika Ilić. This report also seems not to have been far off the mark. As the 
most active former conspirator in emigration Simić regularly corresponded 
with Pilac, the main figure among the remaining Black Handers in Serbia. 
The latter had been one of the ten members of the Supreme Central Com-
mittee of the Black Hand and he had been initially sentenced to death in 
1917 but then to twenty years’ imprisonment before being pardoned with 
the others. Pilac and Dragomir Ž. Stojanović coordinated the efforts of the 
Black Handers to gather as much material and testimonies as possible to 
use for “revision” of the Salonica trial, but they, like most others, did not 
live long enough to see it come true.20 It was also Pilac, along with Milutin 
Lazarević, that responded to the well-known accusations against the Black 
Hand conspiratorial activities by none else than Stojan Protić, their arch-
enemy and former Interior Minister in the Pašić cabinet, in the party organ 
of the Radical Party.21
In the early years of his exile, Simić was struggling financially in 
France and suffered from kidneys. He did not have enough money even for 
such basic necessities as buying clothes or paying rent; he hoped to receive 
18 Ibid. 14434/371, Milutin Lazarević to Dragomir Ž. Stojanović, private, 10 July 1919.
19 Ibid. 14434/4243, Chief of the reporting section of the General Staff, General Petar 
Marković, to the Commander of the City of Belgrade, no date.
20 Živanović, Pukovnik Apis, 13–15. 
21 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/940, Samouprava, no. 68, 1 January 1921.  
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some financial assistance from Stevan Šapinac and his brother, and eventu-
ally a cheque reached him for which he thanked Pilac and a “friend”.22 It 
is clear from his references that he was in personal contact with a number 
of his old friends: Radoje Janković, Mustafa Golubić, Velimir Vemić were 
some of the people he mentioned. Simić seems to have been hopeful that 
amnesty would be soon granted to him and his fellows Black Handers. He 
sent three of his brochures to  Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac but asked him to 
have two of them printed prior to amnesty since they would have no effect 
afterwards; the third one could be printed after the granting of amnesty and 
it would contain things rather unpalatable to Radicals, and Pašić in particu-
lar. If financing these publications presented difficulties, Simić offered to ar-
range it with “certain persons”.23 Yet, as time went by and nothing changed 
in his unenviable émigré status Simić became increasingly despondent. He 
confided in Pilac his disappointment with the inactivity of his friends in 
Serbia: there was talk of grand political events which were awaited from 
time to time, but he was tired of living “provisionally” and considered giving 
up their common cause and going to America, perhaps forever.24 In fact, 
his friends were not as inactive as Simić believed. A member of parliament 
Pavle Andjelić requested from the Justice Minister, Lazar Marković, to pro-
pose to King amnesty for Simić to be announced on the occasion of King’s 
wedding with Princess Maria of Romania. Andjelić used this opportunity 
to advance certain questions for Marković which underscored political as-
pects of Simić’s case and handed in a petition for his amnesty signed by a 
number of respectable citizens from Simić’s home town of Kruševac.25
At the end of February 1924, a group of convicted Black Handers and 
their supporters capitulated before the government. Having lost any hope 
that they would obtain satisfaction in a legal procedure in their lifetime, 
Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac and Lazarević submitted on their behalf a 
statement to the National Assembly in which they renounced their demand 
for revision of the Salonica trial. Moreover, they expressed absolute loyalty 
to the state and the monarch and thus effectively absolved the regime of 
responsibility for the unsavoury methods employed against their friends.26 
22 Ibid. 14434/561, Simić to Milovanović Pilac, private, no date; 14434/616, Simić to 
Pilac, private, Paris, 22 novembar 1921.  
23 Ibid. 14434/368, Simić to Milovanović Pilac, private, no date.  
24 Ibid., 14434/334, Simić to  Milovanović Pilac, private, 14 February 1924. 
25 Ibid. 14434/4279, Copy of Andjelić’s interpellation, 10 June 1922; 14434/4280, Peti-
tion of 51 citizens of Kruševac, 29 May 1922. As opposed to Andjelić, this group of 
citizens appealed for amnesty on humanitarian rather than political grounds. 
26 “Solunski proces i današnja politička kriza”, Politika, 2 March 1924, p. 3. 
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This was a culmination of the development in which some of the 
most implacable Black Handers and Simić’s comrades from Russia caved 
in and returned to the country. Vojislav Gojković turned up in Belgrade in 
1923 and was immediately tried again and sentenced to twenty years in 
prison, but he was pardoned in March 1927, returned to the army and sub-
sequently retired.27 Radoje Janković also came back to the Kingdom from 
Vienna; he was arrested and imprisoned in Sremska Mitrovica for two and 
a half years before being pardoned in May 1925.28 He wrote to the King 
from prison with a plea to release him and grant him an audience to give 
his account of what had taken place.29 Apparently, he had long abandoned 
the notion that the Black Hand victims could be best rehabilitated through 
parliamentary enquiry since he had been deeply sceptical to the possibility 
of a judicial revision of the Salonica trial – although “the monarchical prin-
ciple has died” in him, he was still against the establishment of a republic 
which he though would lead to the demise of the country.30 Whether it was 
because of this loyalty to monarchy, the fact that he had been a leading cor-
respondent for the Pijemont [Piedmont] journal, an unofficial organ of the 
Black Hand, to which Alexander, then Prince, had contributed financially, 
or because Alexander had valued him prior to sending him to Russia him-
self, or combination of all these factors, Janković was finally restored to royal 
favour.31 He was even granted, unlike his friends, a pension for the years 
intervening between his retirement in Russia and return from emigration.32 
In addition, Janković was appointed General-Consul in Chicago as soon as 
he was amnestied and later transferred to New York to do the same job; in 
27 ASANU, Živanović Papers, Decision on amnesty, 14434/3212, 8 March 1927.  
28 Ibid. Decision on amnesty, 14434/3211, 5 May 1925. 
29 Ibid. 14434/366, Janković to King Alexander, 8 October 1923.  
30 Ibid. 14434/369, Janković to “Dear Mister Colonel“ [Pilac?], Anzio, Italy, 26 June 
1919.
31 For Janković’s work for the Pijemont and what had passed between him and Alexan-
der before his departure for Russia see ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/569, Extract 
from the notes of Colonel Vladimir Tucović. Janković was also a respectable writer 
and that was perhaps another and important factor for the leniency with which he was 
treated. For an example of his literary accomplishment see Dani i godine (Belgrade: 
Magelan pres, 2013, rpt. of the 1926 edition). In Vojislav Gojković’s account of the ac-
tivities of the four officers in Russia Janković was said not to have been solidary with his 
colleagues from the start, but they later worked together to stop the Salonica trial and 
save their friends. Gojković also condemned Janković’s later tendency to present himself 
as a main figure in those events at the expense of others. See 14434/354, Gojković to 
“Dear Mister Colonel“ [Pilac?], Baden, 6 February 1922.
32 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/4172, Decision of the Army and Navy Ministry – 
Judicial Department – Pension Section, 18 May 1925. 
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1936, he was sent to Tirana where he served as Minister until the Italian 
occupation of Albania in April 1939.33 He was also politically active during 
Prince Paul’s Regency as a close collaborator of Milan Stojadinović in his 
newly-formed Serbian Radical Party. He addressed Stojadinović’s support-
ers at the gala dinner in Belgrade in March 1940 and became an editor of 
the party organ Ujedinjenje in recognition for his outstanding literary abili-
ties.34 Janković was arrested by the Gestapo in Belgrade in 1941 as a hostage 
and died three years later before the German occupation ended.  
Coming after Gojković’s and Janković’s surrender, the statement that 
Pilac and Lazarević made to the National Assembly deeply embittered ex-
iled Simić. He was not consulted about this step and, in a message sent to 
Milan Gr. Milovanović Pilac, resented it as “nonsense and a treachery to 
his own past”.35 This appears to have been a decisive moment for Simić; 
feeling betrayed by his friends he was pushed into even more determined 
opposition to the regime in his country. It was hardly a coincidence that 
he soon coloured his staunch anti-government stance with rather leftist 
argumentation. In his article reflecting on the statement of his friends, he 
particularly took issue with their avowed willingness even now to sacrifice 
everything for the good of the King and the country. In his view, this action 
of his friends had to do with removing Pašić from power which would even-
tually take place in a few months when the Democrat government headed 
by Ljubomir Davidović was formed. However, Simić professed that Pašić’s 
downfall was far from what was required for internal settling of the country:
All those who think that our state crisis comes only from an excessive state 
corruption to which Nikola Pašić has always been a soul in our country are 
much mistaken. State corruption – to be true, far less than ours to which 
Pašić gives a strong imprint – is suffocating all nations today, because 
bourgeois system, as it has been until today, is about to die. The World 
War and the Russian Revolution caused the last brutalisation of the hith-
erto parliamentary democracy and thus threw all states in a conceptual 
turmoil from which a new democracy and a new state mechanism are yet 
to emerge. It took a world war and of such long duration so that it can be 
seen that we have been political slaves until this day just like before the 
French Revolution, because there cannot be either personal or political or 
33 Belgrade, Arhiv Jugoslavije [Archives of Yugoslavia; hereafter AJ], Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia [collection no. 334, hereafter Foreign Min-
istry], Personal Files, Radoje Janković. 
34 Milan Stojadinović, Dva sporazuma – uvodna reč od Radoja Jankovića (Belgrade: Bib-
lioteka Srpske radikalne stranke, sv. 1, 1940). 
35 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/336, Simić’s letter [the addressee is unknown due 
to the damaged paper] containing a protest to Pilac, 22 March 1924.
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national freedom without certain material security and independence of 
each individual.36        
A crisis of national unity would not be resolved, Simić went on, with 
changes of personnel but rather with a thorough change of the entire state 
order and his friends were wrong because they opposed a change of that 
order. They were also wrong because they were renouncing a revision of the 
Salonica trial for it was impossible to obtain satisfaction for their sufferings 
from the same potentates who had sentenced them in the first place.37
During King Alexander’s reign Simić remained inflexible in his at-
titude towards the Yugoslav regime. He returned to the country in late 
1935, a year after King Alexander had been assassinated in Marseilles; he 
was arrested at the very border and dispatched to prison in Požarevac but 
he was pardoned after sixth months, released and retired in the rank of 
Lieutenant-Colonel.38 This was a clear indication of the more liberal regime 
established under Regent Prince Paul and Prime Minister Stojadinović.39 
In fact, Simić was free to engage in political life and he had close relations 
with the members of the Serbian Cultural Club consisting of some of the 
leading intellectuals.40
He re-emerged on the political scene in 1940 in connection with 
the establishing of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the So-
viet Union in which he figured as an ardent supporter of close coopera-
tion between the two countries. The Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow, 
Colonel Žarko Popović, witnessed Simić’role in these events. “In January 
1941, the former Colonel, Black Hander Božin Simić suddenly turned up 
36 Ibid. Božin Simić, “Jedan koji postavlja stvari na svoje pravo mesto”, Republika no. 27, 
6 April 1924 [director of the Republika was Ljubomir Stojanović, one of the founders of 
the Republican Party]. Original emphasis. 
37 Ibid. It seems that one of the drafts for this article is contained in ASANU, Živanović 
Papers, 14434/617. 
38 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić compiled 
by Milan Živanović. His main sources were presumably Pilac and Lazarević with whom 
Živanović, Apis’s nephew, spent a lot of time collecting material about the Salonica trial 
which he eventually used for his Pukovnik Apis. 
39 It is also characteristic that Apis’s sister, Jelena Živanović, together with her son and 
Apis’s legal heir Milan asked Stojadinović in 1937 for permission to exhume her broth-
er’s body and transfer it from Salonica to Belgrade to be buried in a family tomb next 
to her other son Sanja, killed in action in 1912, and mother Jovanka. See ASANU, 
14434/1807, Živanović Papers, Jelena Živanović to Milan Stojadinović, 19 May 1937. 
There is no record of any reply; Apis’s body has remained in Greece.  
40 AJ, Foreign Ministry, Personal Files, Božin Simić, Biography [compiled by an 
anonymous author in the communist Foreign Ministry after the Second World War], 
334-190-678. 
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in Moscow at the side of our Minister [Milan Gavrilović]. I did not know 
about his presence for a long time until he walked into my office one day and 
requested to see what I was doing.” Popović believed that Simić wanted his 
position and that he was trying to undermine him in the eyes of Gavrilović. 
In late February, Simić disappeared from Moscow. Minister Gavrilović ad-
vised him before departure to meet with General Dušan Simović, the com-
mander of Air Force, in Belgrade. The latter would soon become famous as a 
nominal leader of the officers who carried out coup d’état on 27 March 1941 
and overthrew Prince Paul, a fateful event that brought Yugoslavia into the 
Second World War. Popović claimed that Gavrilović had advised Simović 
to proceed with a putsch. “On 2 April 1941, this mysterious man for liaison 
with the Soviet Union, Božin Simić, who bragged about his strong per-
sonal connections in the USSR, showed up.”41 Popović also pointed out that 
Simić and Simović had been classmates in the Military Academy. Another 
account throws light on what happened later: “After the 27 March putsch 
the preparation for which had not been unknown to him [Simić], he was 
sent to Moscow as a second member of our delegation for the conclusion of 
a pact with Soviet Russia.”42 
This pact was concluded practically simultaneously with the Axis ag-
gression against Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 so it was a dead letter for all 
practical intents and purposes. Simić’s role in these events and the exact 
nature of his connections with the Soviets remain an important and contro-
versial matter. His participation in the Russian revolution and his publically 
proclaimed leftist views were no doubt credentials that recommended him 
for a mission in the USSR. There is no firm evidence, however, that he was 
involved with the communist movement despite the fact that police reports 
in the mid-1920s mentioned his name among other communist activists 
and even dangerous terrorists.43 On the other hand, Simić maintained con-
tacts with communists and, in his own words, “just before the war had two 
meetings in Paris with the emigrant and revolutionary Josip Broz-Tito”, the 
leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the future commander 
of the partisan resistance movement in the Axis-occupied country.44 After 
the annihilation of Yugoslavia in the April War of 1941 Simić joined the 
government-in-exile in London. He wanted to be sent to the insurgents in 
the country but instead became a plenipotentiary Minister to the French 
41 Dragoslav Djordjević, Na raskrsnici 1941 (Toronto: Bratstvo, 1988), 162–164. 
42 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić. 
43 Kosta Nikolić, Boljševizacija KPJ 1919–1929: istorijske posledice (Belgrade: ISI, 1994), 
137–138. 
44 AJ, Foreign Ministry, Personal Files, Božin Simić, Biography [written by Simić him-
self for the communist Foreign Ministry after the Second World War], 334-190-674. 
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National Committee of Charles de Gaulle until he resigned following the 
formation of the Trifunović-Grol-Živković government.45 During the war 
Simić seems to have maintained his special interests for and links with the 
Soviets. In September 1942, he put forward suggestion that King Peter II 
make official visit to Moscow, but Prime Minister, Slobodan Jovanović, set 
his face against this proposal.46
The case of another Black Hander Mustafa Golubić provides a spec-
tacular example of a lifelong revolutionary career. Born in Herzegovina, he 
joined the ranks of Young Bosnians in their resistance to the colonial rule 
of Austria-Hungary over their native land. After the annexation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in 1908 Golubić emigrated to Serbia, received a scholar-
ship but never graduated. He was a volunteer in the Balkan Wars in the 
chetnik unit of the legendary Major Vojislav Tankosić. After the wars he 
returned to studies in Toulouse, France, where he planned, along with an-
other prominent Young Bosnian, Vladimir Gaćinović, an assassination of 
the Bosnian Governor Oskar Potiorek. He re-joined Tankosić’s volunteers 
in the First World War and became close with Apis in the spring of 1915. 
At the latter’s initiative, Golubić and his fellow Bosnian Serb Dušan Semiz 
were dispatched to Russia to induce the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war 
of Yugoslav origin to join the Serbian army – they were on the same mission 
as the four officers discussed above. The fact that they were from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina themselves was supposed to be an asset in this undertaking: 
indeed, they sent more than 1,000 volunteers to Serbia. Having returned 
from Russia in late 1915 Golubić took part in the retreat through Alba-
nia and found himself in Corfu. He then left for Switzerland and later for 
France which would be connected during the Salonica trial with the plans 
to assassinate German Kaiser Wilhelm II – besides Germanophile Greek 
King Constantine – with a view to incriminating Apis. Golubić was arrest-
ed in France, at the request of the Serbian government, and transferred to 
Salonica but he refused to denounce his friends. Therefore, he was brought 
before the Grand Military Court “in the unusual role of an accomplice of 
the accused, although he was not charged himself as he was questioned as 
a witness”.47 
Golubić returned to Belgrade after the war but the authorities in-
terned him in the Rakovica monastery. He was soon forced to move to his 
home town of Stolac since the military authorities considered him and an-
45 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/284, Biographical note on Božin Simić. 
46 Milan Gavrilović, Londonski dnevnik (Belgrade: Žagor, 2013), 115. 
47 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/3220, Biographical note on Mustafa Golubić. The 
author knew Golubić from the time of the war and the two of them met again in Bel-
grade in 1919. 
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other Bosnian Nezir Hadžinalić “two very dangerous criminal persons”.48 
Frustrated because of the treatment meted out to him, Golubić left for 
Vienna in 1920 where many political emigrants of all persuasions found 
their refuge. It was there that he became a member of the Communist 
Party of Yugoslavia. Entering into such subversive anti-state organisation 
was perhaps a logical course of action for an idealistic young man who was 
disappointed with and enraged at what he must have considered a grave 
injustice and senseless persecution. In addition, his restless and adventur-
ous nature was conducive to embracing conspiratorial life style in by then 
illegal communist party. This is perfectly illustrated in an episode when, 
having heard that his brother was arrested and beaten in Herzegovina, 
Golubić sent a personal message to King Alexander warning him that 
he found him personally responsible for the treatment of his brother and 
that he would take revenge for that – and for the death of Apis.49 This 
was not just an empty threat. In the mid-1920s, the police authorities 
in Yugoslavia had information to the effect that Golubić belonged to a 
particularly dangerous terrorist group in Vienna which enjoyed full confi-
dence of the Soviets and was preparing assassinations of highest-ranking 
officials in the Kingdom.50 It was no doubt part of his struggle against the 
Belgrade regime when he published under pseudonym an article in La 
Federation Balkanique in 1924 in which he alleged that Apis had prepared 
the assassination in Sarajevo with the knowledge of Russian Military At-
taché Artamanov, Russian Minister Hartwig, Pašić and heir to the crown 
Alexander.51 
The Yugoslav police was said to have attempted to eliminate him in 
Vienna; at the request of the Viennese police, Golubić was forced to leave 
Austria and he went to Prague and then to Paris. Throughout these émigré 
years Golubić was in contact with Colonel Vladimir Tucović, former Black 
Hander and brother of late Dimitrije Tucović, the leader of the Serbian 
Social Democrat Party. Tucović provided financial means for Golubić’s 
subsistence and once paid him a visit in Paris. The latter was in close touch 
with other Black Handers as well, and Simić in particular. In one of Simić’s 
letters to Pilac, he confirmed that he had received a cheque in Golubić’s 
48 Ibid. 14434/4229, Report of Colonel Josif Kostić to the Command of the City of Bel-
grade, strictly confidential, no. 1881, 6 November 1919; and Commander of the City of 
Belgrade, Colonel Dragutin Uzun Mirković to Army and Navy Minister, confidential 
F.A.o.br.41353, 7 November 1919. 
49 Ibid. 14434/3220, Biographical note on Mustafa Golubić. 
50 Nikolić, Boljševizacija KPJ, 137–138. 
51 Vasa Kazimirović, Crna ruka: ličnosti i dogadjaji u Srbiji od majskog prevrata 1903. do 
solunskog procesa 1917 (Novi Sad: Prometej, 1997), 620. 
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name – it is not clear if that money came from Tucović or someone else.52 
It should be noted that Tucović was first sentenced to death at the Salonica 
trial only to have his sentence relaxed to twenty years in prison. His right 
to receive state pension, along with that of another initially death sentenced 
officer Lieutenant-Colonel Velimir Vemić, was not restored before January 
1935 after the assassination of King Alexander I Kara djordjević.53 As will 
be seen, Tucović would again be of assistance to Golubić. Whether their 
ties stemmed solely from their friendship and Black Hand camaraderie or 
because of Tucović’s involvement with the communist movement remains a 
moot point. Far more certain is the fact that Tucović, just like Golubić, was 
among those who suffered most at the hands of the regime in Belgrade and 
that consideration alone probably went a long way to make him eager to 
contribute to Golubić’s cause.   
In 1927, Golubić went to Moscow “where he completed some 
military course and was sent on ’special assignment’ to Germany. Since then 
Mustafa has scoured Europe with a false passport in his pocket, carried 
out his ’special assignments’ and from time to time come to Moscow for a 
longer or shorter vacation”, recorded his close friend Rodoljub Čolaković 
who spent a lot of time with him during his emigration in the Soviet 
capital in the 1930s.54 This was the start of an extraordinary career as an 
undercover intelligence officer in the Soviet Red Army (“IV department”) 
that turned Golubić into something of a legendary figure for his friends 
and acquaintances among Yugoslav communists.55 Stevan Dedijer, brother 
of Vladimir Dedijer, a close associate and later biographer of Tito, the 
communist dictator of Yugoslavia, helped Golubić to hide from the FBI 
in America for two months after the latter had abducted an American 
citizen (Kuntz) and smuggled him into Moscow. According to Dedijer’s 
information, he assassinated people for the Soviets and even “took part 
in the murder of Stalin’s opponent Leon Trotsky in Mexico”.56 In Paris, 
52 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/561, Simić to Pilac, private, no date.  
53 Ibid. 14434/3213, Amnesty for Vladimir Tucović and Velimir Vemić, 31 January 
1935. 
54 Rodoljub Čolaković, Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju, 3 vols (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1980), 
II, 93–94. 
55 Ibid. III, 404. His life has even been the subject of a dramatic play in Sead Trhulj, 
Mustafa Golubić: čovjek konspiracije (Belgrade: Partizanska knjiga, 1986). The second 
part of the book provides explanations for acts in the play with plenty of historical 
information based on recollections of Golubić’s friends. Plenty of material can also be 
found in Djurica Labović, Tajne misije Mustafe Golubića (Belgrade: Beletra, 1990). 
56 Stevan Dedijer, Špijun kojeg smo voljeli (Zagreb: VBZ, 2011), 122–123; Čolaković, 
Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju, III, 409, confirms that Golubić stayed in the USA for a 
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Golubić became inseparable friends with a physics student and fellow 
communist Čedomilj Popović, a brother-in-law of Apis’s nephew – this 
family connection appears to have played some part in the bonding between 
the two revolutionaries. In fall 1939, Golubić and Popović illegally crossed 
into Yugoslavia. The former removed his black glasses and started to freely 
walk across Belgrade after the putsch of 27 March 1941. Golubić stayed in 
Belgrade after the German forces had occupied the country and set up an 
intelligence centre for the Soviets. When the Germans undertook large-
scale arrests of communists in connection with the impending aggression 
against the USSR in late May, Golubić and Popović were supposed to 
move in a place on the Zlatibor Mountain which Vladimir Tucović had 
prepared for them, but they did not do so.57 This was another occasion on 
which Tucović provided valuable help to his former Black Hand comrade 
although this time it turned out to be in vain. Golubić was arrested on 
6 June 1941 together with his hosts, the Višnjevac family, and the same 
happened to Popović three days later. Despite all the torture by Gestapo 
interrogators, Golubić remained firm and did not even admit his real name. 
Nevertheless, Dragi Jovanović, the head of the special police department in 
Belgrade during the occupation, recognised him as a dangerous communist 
whose activities he had followed for nearly two decades.58 Finally, Golubić 
was shot and buried somewhere in a park in central Belgrade. Not even 
his death passed without controversy. Milovan Djilas, one of Tito’s close 
associates, recalled that Golubić had been hostile to the leadership of the 
Yugoslav communists which feared that he could create trouble for them 
in Moscow. The Yugoslav communists thus followed him and were even 
prepared to kill him if he “proved to be a Trotskyite”. They took his photos 
and showed them to Tito who recognised him as a high-profile secret agent, 
no doubt from his days in Moscow, and ordered that he be left alone.59 
The mystery surrounding Golubić’s last months in Belgrade only served to 
enhance the myth of this elusive individual. 
Looking back at the destinies of a few prominent Black Handers 
following the Salonica trial and the death of their three friends including 
their leader Apis, it should be noted that they proved to be a fairly close-
knit group even at the time of hardship. “Every member of the organisation 
is obliged to provide any kind of assistance to a comrade”, read one of the 
few months and saw Dedijer and Srdjan Prica there.  
57 ASANU, Živanović Papers, 14434/3220, Biographical note on Mustafa Golubić; also 
14434/701, Biographical note on Golubić by Vladimir Tucović. 
58 Ibid.; also Čolaković, Kazivanje o jednom pokoljenju, III, 606–608. 
59 Milovan Djilas, Memoir of a Revolutionary (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1973), 375–376.
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articles of the Rules of Procedure of the Black Hand.60 The members indeed 
lived up to this obligation. They found themselves in a difficult situation 
in the newly-created Yugoslav state for which they had shed blood and 
considerably contributed to its coming into being only to become outcasts, 
subversive elements on which the authorities kept a watchful eye. The re-
maining Black Handers stood and worked together to bring about a revi-
sion of the Salonica trial, rehabilitate their fallen friends and restore their 
own reputation and social standing. However, the regime was too strong 
and had too much of a vested interest to allow them any kind of satisfaction 
which would at the same time mean a confession of its own sins. 
In this uneven struggle, some of the Black Handers headed by Mi-
lan Gr. Milovanović Pilac gave in and abandoned their demands in return 
for a peaceful existence and lenient attitude on the part of the govern-
ment. Pilac passed away in 1933 in a large farm in Vojvodina in which 
he worked as a superintendent; Lazarević dedicated himself to studying 
and writing about the history of recent wars. Some of them not just made 
peace with the authorities but also reacquired a prominent status within 
government establishment — Janković had a fairly successful diplomatic 
stint. The disappearance of King Alexander, whom the Black Handers 
regarded as personal enemy — Nikola Pašić died in 1926 — and the more 
liberal regime of the Regency enabled even those more intransigent, like 
Simić, to end their emigration and be eventually granted amnesty. How-
ever, the likes of Simić, Tucović and, in particular, Golubić remained much 
more embittered and their frustration took the shape of a left-wing op-
position ranging from republicanism to outright communism. A recent 
study has noted that Golubić even organised his intelligence network in 
Belgrade on the pattern of small separate groups as had been the case with 
the Black Hand.61 
After the Second World War, the new communist regime in Yugo-
slavia took a favourable view of the Black Hand and its national revolu-
tionary struggle, but most of all embraced its hostile attitude towards King 
Alexander and Pašić. The surviving Black Handers who had demonstrated 
their leftist convictions before the war were included in the government. 
Having handed his resignation to the royal exile-government, Simić re-
turned to Yugoslavia and became a member of AVNOJ, the main legisla-
tive and executive organ of the communist authorities, in 1945 and later a 
member of the provisional National Assembly. He was also appointed Am-
bassador to Turkey from which position he was retired and lived until 1966. 
60 Živanović, Pukovnik Apis, 672. 
61 Kosta Nikolić, Mit o partizanskom jugoslovenstvu (Belgrade: Zavod za udžbenike, 
2015), 25. 
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Just like Simić, Tucović was a member of AVNOJ in 1945 and then of the 
provisional National Assembly; he died in 1947. Gojković was also elected a 
member of the latter organ in 1945 and then received in the Yugoslav Army 
where he had a nice career until his retirement in 1948.62 Tito’s communists 
cared little for historical truth but rather seized an opportunity to utilise a 
retrial to Apis and others in 1953, something that their friends had long 
sought, in order to defame the royal Yugoslavia and her government. The 
verdicts from the Salonica Trial were annulled.63 The controversy surround-
ing that dubious trial marked the accused individuals for life and involved 
them in often dirty political struggle. For those personally affected, it was, as 
has been seen, not just a matter of setting the historical record straight, but 
also a driving force behind their political activity which was by no means 
insignificant and without interests for the history of Yugoslavia.    
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